Trading mechanism selection with budget constraints by Selcuk, Cemil
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Trading mechanism selection with budget
constraints
Cemil Selcuk
Cardiff University
12. March 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36227/
MPRA Paper No. 36227, posted 28. January 2012 05:09 UTC
Trading Mechanism Selection with Budget Constraints
Cemil Selcuk1
Cardiff University
February 2011
Abstract: We present an equilibrium search model of competing mechanisms where some
buyers are budget constrained. Absent budget constraints, the existing literature capitulates that
if buyers differ in their valuations then in the unique equilibrium all sellers hold second price
auctions (e.g. McAfee (1993)) whereas if buyers are homogeneous then sellers are indifferent
across a large number of payoff-equivalent mechanisms (e.g. Eeckhout and Kircher (2010)).
We show that these results are not robust to the presence of budget constrained buyers; merely
lowering the budgets of a few buyers renders the auction equilibrium as well as payoff equivalence
unsustainable. If buyers differ only slightly in terms of their ability to pay then sellers prefer
fixed price trading; otherwise they prefer auctions.
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JEL: C78, D4, D83
1 Introduction
We study the trading mechanism selection and the performance of various trading mechanisms
in a model of competitive search, where some buyers are budget constrained. The adoption of a
particular mechanism is a strategic decision in that it signals how the seller intends to share the
surplus ex-post, which in turn influences the attractiveness of the store and pins down the expected
demand. Mechanism selection becomes more strategic if potential customers have limited budgets.
Indeed sellers often face buyers who are willing to pay but have limited immediate financial resources
to do so. Casual observations suggest that markets for houses, automobiles and other expensive
durable goods (appliances, electronic equipments, furniture, business equipments, etc.) often exhibit
this trait. Despite its practical importance little attention has been paid to the relationship between
buyers’ limited purchasing power and the sale mechanism in place.2
Absent budget constraints, trading mechanism selection has been studied extensively. In a
competitive search setting where buyers differ in their valuations, McAfee [8] shows that the unique
1Correspondence: Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Aberconway Building, Colum Drive, Cardiff, UK.
Tel: +44 (0)29 2087 0831. E-Mail: selcukc@cardiff.ac.uk
2A number of articles study the presence of budget constrained buyers from a mechanism design perspective. For
instance, Che and Gale [4] obtains an optimal mechanism to sell to a budget constraint buyer; Zheng [15] studies
auctions where budget-constrained bidders may declare bankruptcy. We differ from this literature by introducing
competing sellers.
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equilibrium entails all sellers holding second price auctions with a reserve and buyers randomizing
across stores. Peters [9] generalizes McAfee’s result with heterogeneous sellers. When buyers are
identical in their valuations, payoff equivalence emerges. Kultti [7] demonstrates that price posting
is payoff equivalent to auctions; Eeckhout and Kircher [5] show that payoff equivalence is not specific
to these two mechanism, rather it holds for all ‘payoff complete’ mechanisms that included fixed
price trading and auctions.3
We demonstrate that these results are not robust to the presence of budget constrained buyers.
For instance, the auction equilibrium in McAfee [8] fails to exist if low budget customers differ only
slightly from high budget customers: a seller can unilaterally do better than holding an auction if
he chooses fixed price trading. The reason is this. In a bidding contest high types always win; a low
type can only purchase if there is no high type present in the auction and even then he faces the
prospect of competing against other low types. So, if a seller switches to fixed price trading, which
is egalitarian at the point of service, then he can attract low types almost for sure and improve his
payoff. Of course there needs to be ‘enough room’ so that the seller can post a profit maximizing
price; that is the budgets of low types need to be sufficiently high. Such deviation is possible even
when there are very few low types present in the market. So, merely lowering the budgets of a few
buyers renders the auction equilibrium in [8] unsustainable against price posting. Payoff equivalence
results disappear because of similar reasons.
We characterize outcomes where sellers trade via price posting and via auctions and then we
provide sufficient conditions under which either mechanism emerges in equilibrium. With fixed-price
trading there are three possibilities:
1. Customers differ only slightly in terms of their ability to pay. The budget constraint is slack;
so all sellers post affordable prices and no screening takes place.
2. Low types have severely limited budgets, so, no seller trades with them. Only high types can
afford to shop; low types are completely screened out ex-ante.
3. Customers differ moderately. In this case some stores choose to be expensive and trade with
high types while other stores remain affordable and trade with low types. Cheap stores are
more crowded and possess a higher trade risk—the risk of not being able to purchase. This
is why high budget customers strictly prefer expensive stores and avoid shopping at cheap
stores.
With second price auctions sellers do not attempt to screen out low types ex-ante (posting an
unaffordable reserve price effectively prevents low types from participating in the auction); screening
occurs ex-post. Being expensive and catering to high types pays off if the expensive store possesses
some distinct advantage. With fixed price trading there is such an advantage: a higher probability
of service. But when the trading mechanism is an auction then high types are not worried about
by the presence of low types since they can outbid them. The advantage disappears hence ex-ante
screening does not take place.
The decision between auctions and fixed price trading boils down to the degree of heterogeneity
across customers. If they differ only slightly in terms of their ability to pay then sellers prefer
3The literature on competing mechanisms may be divided into two categories. The first category focuses on a
monopolist seller who selects a trading mechanism in order to maximize his expected profit. The set of alternatives
typically includes auctions, bargaining and price posting. The approach is ‘partial equilibrium’ in that the demand is
taken as given and mechanisms feature exogenous costs. Among others see [13, 14] and the references therein. The
second category, to which this paper belongs, has competitive environments where demand at a store endogenously
depends on the trading mechanism in place; for instance see [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12]. The main difference between our paper
and the preceding articles is the presence of budget constrained buyers.
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fixed price trading, otherwise they prefer auctions. The intuition is same as above. In terms of
efficiency both outcomes are constrained efficient. With risk neutral buyers and sellers efficiency
is synonymous with maximizing the number of trades. This can be achieved if ex-ante screening
does not take place, i.e. if all sellers cater to both types of customers. With fixed price trading
ex-ante screening may occur, however the outcome that survives the availability of auctions is the
one without screening. With auctions ex-ante screening never occurs; so, in either case the resulting
outcome is efficient.
2 Model
Consider an economy with a large number of risk-neutral buyers and sellers, where the buyer-seller
ratio is λ > 0. Each seller is endowed with one unit of a good and wants to sell at a price above
his reservation price of zero. Similarly each buyer wants to purchase one unit of an indivisible good
and is willing to pay up to his reservation price, which is normalized to one. Buyers are identical
in terms of their valuation of the good but they differ in terms of their ability to pay. A fraction
l of buyers (low types) can pay up to b < 1 whereas the rest (high types) can pay pay up to 1.
The parameters l and b are common knowledge; let λ = λ (1− l) and λ=λl. The current setup has
buyers who are homoegenous in their valuations; in Appendix II we extend the model by considering
buyers with different valuations.
The game proceeds in two stages. In the first stage sellers simultaneously and independently
choose a mechanism m ∈M and a reserve price r ∈ [0, 1] . The pair (m, r) pins down the sale price
pm,n,n (r) for every possible demand realization, where n and n denote the number of high and low
type customers at a store. In the second stage buyers observe sellers’ selections and choose one
store to visit; however once they reach a store they cannot move elsewhere. If the customer is alone
at the store then he pays the reserve price and obtains the good for sure; however in case of excess
demand the sale price and the probability of service depend on n and n as well as sale mechanisms
in place. If trade takes place at price p then the seller realizes payoff p and the buyer 1− p. Those
who do not trade earn zero. Once players realize their gains the game ends.
Demand Distribution. We focus on strongly symmetric outcomes, where, on and off the equi-
librium path, buyers of the same type direct their search randomly and identically across stores. In
a large economy with infinitely many buyers and sellers the distribution of demand across stores
is i.i.d. with Poisson arrival rates λm and λm. We refer to these parameters as the queue lengths
consisting of high and low types. So, the probability that a seller meets exactly n high type buyers
equals to
zn(λm) =
e−λmλnm
n! for n = 0, 1, ... (1)
The probability of meeting low types is likewise. The queue lengths are endogenous and are deter-
mined via indifference conditions (3). Letting γm denote the fraction of stores trading via mechanism
m we have ∑
m∈M
γmλm = λ and
∑
m∈M
γmλm = λ. (2)
Screening. The reserve price may be used as an ex-ante screening device. A seller who wishes to
trade with high types only can do so by posting r > b. We assume that sellers can use cash bonds
or financial disclosure requirements to implement ex-ante screening.4
4Buyers pay upfront a sum equal to the reserve price to a third party. In case the buyer obtains the good, the
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The type of a buyer does not affect his likelihood of meeting a seller (assuming, of course, the
reserve price is affordable). The probability of service, however, might be affected by the type. Let
q
m
(n, n) denote the probability of service for a low type customer and let qm be likewise. With
auctions we have
q
a
(n, n) =
{
0 if n ≥ 1
1/n if n = 0 , qa (n, n) =
1
n
.
A low type can only purchase if there is no high type present in the auction, because high types
can always outbid low types in a bidding contest (see below). If indeed n = 0 then each low type
has an equal chance 1/n of being served. High types, on the other hand, are not deterred by the
presence of low types, which is why qa = 1/n. For fixed price trading we have
q
f
(n, n) = qf (n, n) =
1
n+ n,
which means that each customer, no matter what his type, has an equal chance of being served.
Fixed price trading, unlike auctions, does not screen out customers ex-post; hence it is egalitarian
at the point of service.
Sale Prices. With fixed price trading the sale price equals to the list price for all demand
realizations, that is pf,n,n = r for all n and n. With second price auctions the reserve price r is
charged if a single customer is present. In case multiple customers show up bidding ensues. We
assume that a bid must be accompanied by a deposit of equal value. If the bidder wins, then he
gets back the difference between the deposit and the sale price. Otherwise he gets back the entire
deposit. This requirement effectively prevents buyers to bid over their budgets. Given that low
types cannot overbid, it is straightforward to verify that the followings are dominant strategies: low
types bid b and high types bid 1.5
Suppose r ≤ b. Given the strategies, the sale price equals to
pa,n,n =

r if n+ n = 1
b if n ≤ 1 and n+ n ≥ 2
1 if n ≥ 2
.
If a single customer shows up, be it a high type or a low type, the reserve price is charged. If there
are multiple customers and at most one of them is a high type then the sale price b. Finally if there
deposit is transferred to the seller; otherwise it is returned to its rightful owner at no cost. Such a practice prevents
low types from showing up at unaffordable stores. A financial disclosure requirement is also effective.
5The picture changes if low types are allowed to overbid. Indeed if all low types bid just b then one of them can win
the item for sure by bidding b+ε (assuming no high types are present at the store). So the pair of strategies where low
types bid b and high types bid 1 no longer constitute an equilibrium. In this case, one needs to specify in the auction
rules what happens when the winner is in default; for instance one can assume that he does not receive the item
plus he incurs some dis-utility c (because of punishment, legal consequences etc.). Going with this interpretation one
can show that in an auction where only low types are present, say n of them, there exists a unique symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium where each buyer overbids with some positive probability. In particular this probability falls
with n and c, i.e. buyers are less likely to overbid if the punishment is high or if they face stiffer competition. Yet the
probability is non-zero for any finite value of c, i.e. no matter how large the punishment is, it does not prevent buyers
from overbidding. In the full fledged model, given the respective arrival rates of high and low types, each customer
needs to figure out how many of the n customers at a store are high/low types. Given the posterior probabilities,
mixed strategies then can be obtained. The outcome, however, is non-trivial. To detour this complications, we simply
assume that each bid must be accompanied by a deposit of equal value. See Zheng [15] for an auction setting where
default is an option.
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are multiple high types, then the the sale price is 1. If r > b then n = 0 as low types cannot afford
to visit. So,
pa,n,n =
{
r if n = 1
1 if n ≥ 2 .
Buyers. Buyers observe sellers’ selections and choose to visit a store. The expected utilities are
given by
UH
(
r, λm, λm|m
)
=
∑
n=0
∑
n=0
zn
(
λm
)
zn (λm) qm (n+ 1, n)
(
1− pn+1,n,m
)
,
UL
(
r, λm, λm|m
)
= I (b)
∑
n=0
∑
n=0
zn
(
λm
)
zn (λm) qm (n, n+ 1)
(
1− pn,n+1,m
)
,
where I (b) is an indicator function satisfying I (b) = 0 if r > b and I (b) = 1 if r ≤ b. A quick
interpretation of the first line is this. With probability znzn a high type buyer who arrives at a
store encounters n high type and n low type competitor buyers. He purchases with probability
qm (n+ 1, n) and his payoff is 1−pn+1,n,m. The second line is interpreted similarly except one needs
to account for affordability.
Lemma 2.1 We have
∂UH (·|m)
∂r
< 0, ∂UH (·|m)
∂λm
< 0, and ∂UH (·|m)
∂λm
< 0 for m = a, f.
Assuming r ≤ b, the partial derivatives of UL with respect to r, λm and λm have the same signs.
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 1 in [3].
Put simply, the Lemma says that buyers dislike expensive and crowded stores. The sign of the
first partial derivative is obvious. For the second and the third note that a larger λm or λm shifts
the probability mass from low to high demand realizations. Such a shift causes the expected utility
to decline because customer are less likely to be served at stores with high demand realizations.
A buyer visits a store only if his expected payoff from visiting there is as high as he would obtain
anywhere else. More precisely λm and λm must satisfy
λm
{
= 0 if UH < U
∈ (0,∞) if UH = U and λm
{
= 0 if UL < U
∈ (0,∞) if UL = U , (3)
where
U := max
r∈[0,1],m∈M
UH
(
r, λm, λm|m
)
and U := max
r∈[0,1],m∈M
UL
(
r, λm, λm|m
)
.
We refer to U and U as the market utilities of high and low type customers. Lemma 2.1 implies
that buyers can be indifferent to stores by adjusting the queue lengths. Indeed they may show
up at stores that offer unattractive terms of trade as long as they expect fewer competitors there.
Conditions (2) and (3) uniquely pin down the queue lengths across stores.
Because of strong symmetry the indifference condition (3) must hold on and off the equilibrium
path, i.e. buyers out of equilibrium must behave identically and must be indifferent across sellers.6
So, the out-of-equilibrium distribution of demand at a deviant store is still Poisson, where queue
lengths λ′m and λ′m satisfy (3). Notice, however, market utilities are not affected by a deviation.
6See Abreu [1].
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The reason is that in a large economy the covariance of demand across stores vanishes; hence a
change in the probability of visiting a particular store does not affect the distribution of demand at
other stores (see [2], [10], [11]).
Sellers. The expected profit of a seller depends on the sale mechanism in place m, the reserve
price r and the queue lengths λm, λm. We have
Π
(
r, λm, λm|m
)
=
∑
n=0
∑
n=0
zn
(
λm
)
zn (λm) pn,n,m.
With probability znzn the seller meets n high type and n low type customers and sells at the price
pn,n,m; his payoff is zero if he does not get a customer. The problem of a of a seller is given by
max
m∈M, r∈[0,1], (λm,λm)∈R2+
Π
(
r, λm, λm|m
)
subject to (3). (4)
Indifference conditions in (3) determine the queue lengths λm, λm as functions of the trading mech-
anism m and the list price r. In particular λm and λmfall in r7 which means that the seller faces a
trade off between revenue (intensive margin) and expected demand (extensive margin): on the one
hand there is the desire to sell at a high price but on the other hand there is the fear of not being
able to trade.
Definition 2.1 A strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium consists of a tuple
(
λ, λ, r
)
satisfying
the demand distribution (1), indifference (3) and profit maximization (4).
The fraction of stores trading under each mechanism, given by (2) and also implicitly part of
the equilibrium, can easily be recovered from the conditions above.
3 Analysis
3.1 Homogeneous Buyers
To build intuition consider the case with homogeneous buyers (no budget constraints).
Lemma 3.1 Suppose that buyers are homogeneous. There exists a continuum of equilibria where
either mechanism may be offered by any fraction of sellers. Sellers competing via fixed price trading
post
rf (λ) = 1− z1 (λ)1− z0 (λ) (5)
while sellers trading via auctions post ra (λ) = 0. Mechanisms are payoff equivalent; either mecha-
nism delivers an expected profit of
pi (λ) = 1− z0 (λ)− z1 (λ) . (6)
Buyers randomize across stores and expect to earn z0 (λ) .
7Suppose r ≤ b. Observe that with fixed pricing UH (·|f) = UL (·|f) , which means that the constraints UH = U
and UL =U are identical. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem one obtains
dr
dλf
= −∂UH/∂λf
∂UH/∂r
< 0 and dr
dλf
= −∂UH/∂λf
∂UH/∂r
< 0.
The numerators and the denominators are both negative from Lemma 2.1. Similarly one can show that if r > b then
dr/dλf < 0.
With auctions we have UH (·|a) > UL (·|a) , so, one needs the General Implicit Function Theorem to show that λa
and λa fall in r. In the proof of Proposition 3.2 we establish these relationships.
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The proof is in the appendix. The payoff equivalence result is in line with Kultti [7] and
Eeckhout and Kircher [5]; see also Camera and Selcuk [3]. The fact that rf > ra reveals why
different mechanisms such as price posting and auctions may coexist in equilibrium. Sellers trading
via auctions correctly anticipate that they will end up charging more than the reserve price, so they
set ra = 0 which clearly is below what fixed price traders ask. On expected terms, however, all
sellers earn the same.
3.2 Ex-ante Screening: Fixed Price Trading
The following proposition outlines possible outcomes in the full fledged model when sellers compete
via price posting.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose M consists of fixed pricing only. Depending on the severity of the budget
constraint there are three possible outcomes.
1. Interior Equilibrium: If rf (λ) < b then the budget constraint is slack; the equilibrium with
homogeneous buyers remains.
2. Corner Equilibrium: If b < pi
(
λ
)
then all sellers advertise rf
(
λ
)
> b; so, only high budget
customers can afford to shop. Low types are screened out completely.
3. Separating Equilibrium: If
pi
(
λ
)
≤ b ≤ rf (λ) (7)
then a fraction ϕ of stores (‘cheap stores’) post rC = b while remaining stores (‘expensive stores’)
post rE > b. Low types can only afford to shop at cheap stores whereas high types strictly prefer
shopping at expensive stores i.e. they avoid shopping at cheap stores.
Figure 1a provides an illustration (both figures are drawn for λ = 1). The interior equilibrium
exists if b is high; the corner equilibrium exists if b is low and the separating equilibrium exists if b
is moderate.
Proof. The first claim is obvious. For the second, conjecture an outcome where sellers target high
types only. This means that the effective buyer-seller ratio shrinks to λ; hence sellers post rf
(
λ
)
and
consequently earn pi
(
λ
)
. Now consider a seller who unilaterally deviates by posting some r′ ≤ b.
He gets all low types for sure and therefore earns b for sure. But since he trades via fixed pricing he
cannot earn more than b. The condition b < pi
(
λ
)
guarantees that there is no profitable deviation.
For the third claim suppose (7) holds. In this parameter region conjecture an outcome where a
fraction ϕ of stores (cheap stores) advertise rC = b targeting low types while the remaining stores
(expensive stores) advertise some rE > b targeting high types. We further conjecture that high
types strictly prefer expensive stores and do not shop at cheap stores (to be verified later). Along
the conjecture the queue length at a cheap store equals to λ/ϕ := λC . It follows that the expected
earnings for sellers and buyers are
ΠC := [1− z0 (λC)] b and UC := 1− z0 (λC)
λC
(1− b) .
Expensive stores receive high types only; so the queue length equals to λE := λ/ (1− ϕ) . The
problem of an expensive store is similar to the one analyzed in the homogeneous model, except the
effective buyer-seller ratio is λE instead of λ, hence we have
rE := rf (λE) ; ΠE := pi (λE) ; UE := z0 (λE) .
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The value of ϕ is pinned down by the equal profit condition ΠE = ΠC . Let
∆ (ϕ) = ΠE −ΠC = pi (λE)− [1− z0 (λC)] b
and note that (i) d∆/dϕ > 0, (ii) ∆ (1) = 1 −
(
1− e−λ
)
b > 0, and (iii) ∆ (0) = pi
(
λ
)
− b < 0,
where (i) and (ii) are obvious and (iii) follows from condition (7). The Intermediate Value Theorem
implies that there exists some ϕ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying the equal profit condition. Now we need to verify
the preceding conjectures; namely we need (i) rE > b so that expensive stores are unaffordable and
(ii) UE > UC so that high types deem cheap stores inferior. The following Lemma establishes this
task.
Lemma 3.2 We have: (i) ϕ < l and therefore λE < λ < λC , (ii) rE > b, and (iii) UE > UC .
Proof. Start by showing that ϕ < l. By contradiction suppose that ϕ = l. This means that
λE = λC = λ and therefore
∆ = pi (λ)− [1− z0 (λ)] b = [1− z0 (λ)] [rf (λ)− b] .
By condition (7) the expression rf (λ) − b is positive, which implies that ∆ > 0 contradicting the
equilibrium condition ∆ = 0. Hence ϕ 6= l. The inequality gets worse when ϕ > l because ∆ rises
in ϕ. Hence, the only possibility is ϕ < l, and therefore we have λE < λ < λC . Next we show that
rE > b. Solving the equilibrium condition ∆ = 0 for b one obtains
b = rE × 1− z0 (λE)1− z0 (λC) .
Since λE < λ < λC the result follows. Finally we show that UE > UC . We have
UE − UC = z0 (λE)− 1− z0 (λC)−ΠC
λC
= z0 (λE)− z0 (λE) + z1 (λE)− z0 (λC)
λC
= z0 (λC)
λC
[ex (x− 1) + 1] > 0
where x = λC −λE > 0. In the first line we used (16), in the second line we substituted ΠE. for ΠC
and finally, in the third line note that the expression ex (x− 1) + 1 is positive for all x 6= 0.
pi(λ) = b
_
rf (λ) = b
Interior Equilibrium
Corner Equilibrium
Seperating Equilibrium
r =
 b^
Interior Equilibrium
Corner Equilibrium
Figure 1a Figure 1b
Outcomes with Fixed Price Trading Outcomes with Auctions
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Lemma 3.2 tells that cheap stores are more crowded than expensive stores. So, the trade risk—
the risk of not being able to purchase—is greater at cheap stores. This is why high type customers
avoid shopping at such stores. In addition observe that implicit behind these results is the use of
cash bonds to implement ex-ante screening.
3.3 Ex-post Screening: Second Price Auctions
Now, suppose that sellers trade via second price auctions only. We focus on outcomes where all
sellers advertise the same reserve price r ≤ b and buyers randomize across stores (Proposition 3.3
demonstrates that no equilibrium exists with r > b). Along such an equilibrium path the queue of
a seller consists of λ low types plus λ high types. Expected utilities are
UH
(
r, λ, λ
)
= z0z0 (1− r) + z0 (1− z0) (1− b) and (8)
UL
(
r, λ, λ
)
= z0z0 (1− r) + z0
1− z0 − z1
λ
(1− b) , (9)
where zn := zn
(
λ
)
and zn is likewise.8 The expected profit of a seller is given by
Π
(
r, λ, λ
)
= (z0z1 + z1z0) r + [z0 (1− z0 − z1) + z1 (1− z0)] b+ 1− z0 − z1.
With probability z0z1 + z1z0 the seller gets exactly one customer and charges the reserve price r.
The expression in square brackets is the probability of getting no high types and at least two low
types plus the probability of getting exactly one high type and at least one low type. In either case
the sale price equals to b. Finally 1− z0− z1 is the probability of getting multiple high types so the
sale price is 1. Using (8), (9) and rearranging Π we obtain
Π
(
r, λ, λ
)
= 1− z0z0 − λUH − λUL. (10)
The expression 1 − z0z0 can be interpreted as the expected revenue. It is the value created by
a sale (one), multiplied by the probability of trading 1 − z0z0. Given (λ, λ, r) one can interpret
λUH + λUL as the expected cost. The seller promises payoff UH to each high type and UL to each
low type customer; since the queue has λ high types and λ low types the expected total cost equals
to λUH + λUL. Observe that (10) collapses to (16) when b = 1 and l = 0 (homogeneous buyers).
The seller’s problem is maxr∈[0,b],(λ,λ)∈R2+ Π
(
r, λ, λ
)
subject to
UH
(
r, λ, λ
)
≤ U with equality if λ > 0
UL
(
r, λ, λ
)
≤ U with equality if λ > 0,
where U and U, which are taken parametrically, are market utilities for high and low types.
8UH is interpreted as follows. With probability z0z0 the high type buyer is alone at the store, so he pays the reserve
price r and obtains the item. With probability z0 (1− z0) some low types are present yet he is the only high type; so
he overbids them and buys the good for sure paying b. With the complementary probability he finds other high types
at the store in which case he ends up with zero surplus whether he acquires the item or not. UL can be interpreted
similarly. With probability z0z0 the low type buyer is alone at the store; so, he pays the reserve price r and gets the
item for sure. If he encounters other low types, but not a high type, then the sale price is b and the good is allocated
randomly. The expression in front of 1 − b is the probability of finding no high types multiplied by the probability
of finding at least another low type and acquiring the item. Indeed
∑∞
n=1
zn(λ)
n+1 =
1
λ
∑∞
n=2 zn (λ) =
1−z0(λ)−z1(λ)
λ
.
Finally, if a high type is present then a low type has no chance of buying the good.
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Lemma 3.3 Suppose M includes second price auctions only. An outcome where some sellers ad-
vertise r > b cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
Proof. By contradiction suppose there exists an equilibrium where some stores (expensive stores)
advertise r∗ > b. Their queue λ∗ consists of high types only. Let z∗0 := z0
(
λ
∗) and note that the
expected utility of a high type visiting an expensive store equals to U∗H = z∗0 (1− r∗) , whereas the
expected profit of such a store is Π∗ = 1− z∗0−λ∗U∗H . Below we demonstrate that if a particular ex-
pensive seller (the deviant seller) posts b instead of r∗ then he can do better than Π∗ while providing
high types exactly with payoff U∗H . Hence the outcome cannot correspond to an equilibrium.
Since the deviant seller posts b, he gets low types as well as high types, so let λ′ and λ′ denote
his expected demand consisting of low and high types, respectively. Substitute r = b into (8) and
(9) to obtain
U ′H = z′0 (1− b) and U ′L = z′0
1− z′0
λ′
(1− b) ,
where z′n := zn
(
λ
′) and z′n := zn (λ′). Use (10) and the expressions for U ′H and U ′L to obtain the
expected profit of the deviant seller:
Π′ = 1− z′0 − z′1 + bz′1 + bz′0
(
1− z′0
)
.
Now we show that Π′ > Π∗ when U ′H = U∗H . Note that
U ′H = U∗H ⇔ z′0 (1− b) = z∗0 (1− r∗) ,
implying that λ′ > λ∗ since r∗ > b. The last term in Π′ is positive hence
∆ = z∗0 − z′0 + z′1(1− r∗)− z′1 (1− b) > 0⇒ Π′ > Π∗.
Substitute z′0 (1− b) for z∗0 (1− r∗) into ∆ and rearrange to obtain
∆ = z′0 [ex − 1− (1− b)x] ,
where x = λ′ − λ∗ > 0. The expression inside the square brackets is positive for all x > 0, hence
∆ > 0, and therefore Π′ > Π∗.
The Lemma rules out a potential pooling equilibrium, where all sellers advertise r > b, as well
as a separating equilibrium, where a fraction of sellers advertise r > b while the rest advertise
b or less. So with second price auctions—unlike fixed pricing—low types are never screened out
ex-ante; neither partially nor completely. This is true no matter how small the budget is or how
few the low types are. The intuition is this. Being expensive and catering to high types pays off
if the expensive store possesses some distinct advantage. With fixed price trading there is such an
advantage: expensive stores are less crowded (low types cannot afford to show up there ) hence high
types are more likely to be served. But when the trading mechanism is an auction then high types
are not deterred by the presence of low types; they can outbid them. The advantage disappears
hence the outcome with r > b cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
If an auction equilibrium exists it must be with all sellers catering to both types of customers.
The following proposition describes two such outcomes; one with r < b and the other with r = b.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose M includes second price auctions only. There are two possible outcomes:
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1. Interior Equilibrium: If
r̂ := λ− z1 − λz1
z0 − z20 + λz1 − z1
(1− b) ≤ b (11)
then all sellers post r = r̂.
2. Corner Equilibrium: If r̂ > b then all sellers post r = b.
The proof is in the appendix. Figure 1b provides an illustration: if b is large and/or if l is small
then r̂ is below b, so the interior equilibrium emerges; otherwise the corner equilibrium emerges.
Observe that r̂ is an explicit function of the parameters λ, b and l. In particular if b = 1 or
l = 0 (i.e. no budget constraints) then r̂ = 0 which is the equilibrium reserve price of auctions in
a homogeneous setting (see Lemma 3.1). One can verify that dr̂/db < 0 and dr̂/dl > 0 i.e. sellers
raise r̂ in response to a drop in b or an increase in l. Basically sellers offset the shortfall in profits
due to budget constraints by raising the reserve price.
Finally note that, be it the corner case or the interior case, reserve prices are affordable, so all
sellers expect to have a queue consisting of λ+ λ = λ.
3.4 Efficiency
Proposition 3.3 Suppose M includes fixed pricing and second price auctions. An outcome where
all sellers compete in second price auctions is constrained efficient, whereas an outcome where all
sellers trade via fixed pricing is inefficient except the interior case (i.e. except when rf (λ) ≤ b).
Proof. Recall that low and high type buyers are identical in terms of their valuation of the good.
If trade occurs at some price p, the buyer, no matter what his type, obtains payoff 1 − p; hence
the total surplus equals to 1. Therefore, as in the case with homogeneous buyers, efficiency is
is synonymous with maximizing the the total number of trades in the market. The proof of the
proposition amounts to showing that an auction outcome yields strictly more trades than a fixed
price outcome. In an auction outcome, be it the the corner case or the interior case, the queue
length of a seller equals to λ+λ = λ. Therefore the probability of trade at a given store is 1− e−λ.
With fixed price trading there are three cases. (i) Interior equilibrium: the budget constraint is
slack hence sellers receive both types of buyers. This is identical to the case with auctions. (ii)
Corner equilibrium: sellers ignore low types and trade with high types only. The probability of
trade equals to 1− e−λ. Since λ > λ this outcome has less trade than an auction outcome, hence it
is inefficient. (iii) Separating equilibrium: expensive stores trade with high types and cheap stores
trade with low types. The weighted probability of trade equals to
1− ϕe−λC − (1− ϕ) e−λE .
An auction outcome yields more trades if
ϕe−λC + (1− ϕ) e−λE > e−λ.
Recall that (i) ϕλC + (1− ϕ)λE = λ and (ii) λC > λ > λE (Lemma 3.2). Since e−x is convex the
inequality holds; so, the separating equilibrium outcome is also inefficient.
4 Auctions or Price Posting?
So far we have focused on outcomes where all sellers trade either via fixed pricing or auctions.
Below we discuss what happens when sellers are free to choose. A first result is that an auction
equilibrium fails to exist if b is large, i.e. if low types differ only slightly from high types.
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Proposition 4.1 Suppose M includes fixed pricing and second price auctions. If
b > max
{
r̂, 1 + UL (r̂) lnUL (r̂)1− UL (r̂) := Ψ1
}
(12)
then there is no equilibrium where all sellers trade via second price auctions.
Proof. In the parameter space characterized by (12) we have r̂ < b; so Proposition 3.2 implies that
if an auction equilibrium exists it must be interior where sellers post r̂. In such an outcome agents’
earnings are UH
(
r̂, λ, λ
)
, UL
(
r̂, λ, λ
)
and Π
(
r̂, λ, λ
)
. Notice that UL < z0z0 < UH . Indeed
UH > z0z0 ⇔
1− z0
z0
(1− b) > r̂ and
UL < z0z0 ⇔
1− z0 − z1
z1
(1− b) < r̂,
both of which are true for all λ, λ and b. These inequalities will prove useful below.
Now, consider a seller who switches to fixed pricing and posts some r′ < b. Let U ′ denote the
expected utility of buyers at the deviant store. Observe that U ′ is the same for both types of buyers
since the seller competes via fixed pricing. Hence the deviant store attracts low budget customers
only. To see why notice that
U ′ = 1− z
′
0z
′
0
λ
′ + λ′
(
1− r′)
where z′0 := z0
(
λ
′) and z′0 := z0 (λ′). The queue lengths λ′ and λ′satisfy
λ′

= 0 if U ′ < UL
∈ (0,∞) if U ′ = UL
=∞ if U ′ > UL
and λ′

= 0 if U ′ < UH
∈ (0,∞) if U ′ = UH
=∞ if U ′ > UH
.
Since UH > UL, we have either U ′ = UL < UH or UL < UH = U ′. The latter is impossible since
UL < U
′ implies that λ = ∞, which in turn means that U ′ = 0 contradicting UH = U ′ > 0. The
former case, however, is feasible: λ′ ∈ (0,∞) adjusts to satisfy U ′ = UL whereas λ′ = 0 because
U ′ < UH .
Below we show that the deviant seller can provide low types the same utility UL yet he can earn
more than Π. His problem is
max
r′<b,λ′∈R+
[
1− z0
(
λ′
)]
r′ subj. to U ′ = UL
taking UL as given. The FOC z0
(
λ′
)
= UL implies that he posts r′ = rf
(
λ′
)
and expects to earn
Π′ = pi
(
λ′
)
= 1− z′0 − z′1.
The FOC further implies that λ′ = − lnUL; hence condition (12) guarantees that r′ < b, which is
what we have conjectured.
Below we verify that Π′ exceeds Π. We have
Π′ > Π⇔ z0z0 + λUL + λUH − z′0 − z′1 > 0.
Since UH > UL and λ+ λ = λ it suffices to show
∆ := z0z0 + λUL − z′0 − z′1 > 0.
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Observe that z0z0 = e−λ. In addition the FOC z′0 = UL implies that λ′ > λ because UL < z0z0.
Substitute z′0 = UL into ∆ obtain
∆ = z′0 (ex − 1− x) ,
where x := λ′ − λ > 0. The expression inside the parentheses is positive for all x > 0. Hence the
deviation is profitable.
The proposition establishes that if low types differ only slightly from high types then an auction
equilibrium cannot survive the availability of fixed pricing. The intuition is this. With auctions
low types are always second to high types at the point of service, no matter how small the budget
difference is. A low type can only purchase if there is no high type around; and even then he has to
compete against other low types. So, if a seller switches to fixed price trading, which is egalitarian
at the point of service, then he can attract low types almost for sure and improve his payoff. Of
course there needs to be ‘enough room’ so that he can post a profit maximizing price, that is b
needs to be large enough; hence Condition (12). Figure 2a, which is drawn for λ = 1, depicts the
parameter space outlined by Condition (12). Notice that the auction equilibrium fails to exist even
when there are very few low types (l ≈ 0) who have sufficiently large budgets.
Ψ1 = b
r = b^
No Auction Equilibrium
Auction Equilibrium
Fixed Price Equilibrium
rf (λ) = b
Ψ2 = b
r = b^
Figure 2a Figure 2b
Auction equilibrium fails to exist Equilibria with M={price posting, auctions}
In a similar setting McAfee [8] shows that the unique equilibrium entails all sellers holding second
price auctions with a reserve and buyers randomizing across stores. Peters [9] generalizes McAfee’s
result with heterogeneous sellers. We demonstrate that existence of an auction equilibrium is not
robust to budget constraints: merely lowering the budgets of a few buyers (l ≈ 0) renders the
auction equilibrium unsustainable.
The setup in McAfee [8] and others has buyers who differ in their valuations. In our model
buyers have identical valuations, so Proposition 4.1 should apply in a heterogeneous setting as well.
To illustrate this point, in Appendix II we extend the current setup by considering buyers who
are heterogeneous in their valuations. In particular we let a fraction of customers have valuation
v < 1 for the good and we assume that some of the high value customers have low budgets so that
b < v < 1. We show that if buyers are sufficiently similar in terms of their valuations and budgets,
i.e if condition (24) holds, then, again, the auction equilibrium cannot survive fixed price trading.
13
Finally we provide some sufficient conditions for the existence of a fixed price equilibrium and
an auction equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2 . Suppose M includes fixed pricing and second price auctions. If rf (λ) ≤ b then
all sellers trade via fixed pricing and post rf (λ). If
b < min
{
r̂,
1− z0 − z1
1− z0 − z1 + z0z0
:= Ψ2
}
(13)
then all sellers trade via auctions and post r = b. Both equilibria are constrained efficient.
The proof is in the appendix. The proposition outlines two areas in the parameter space where
either fixed pricing or auctions emerge as the equilibrium trading mechanism; see Figure 2b for an
illustration. The choice between price posting and second price auctions boils down to the degree
of heterogeneity across customers, that is how different buyers are in terms of their ability to pay.
If they differ only slightly, i.e. if b ≥ rf (λ), then sellers prefer to trade via fixed pricing. If they
differ significantly, i.e. if (13) holds, then sellers prefer second price auctions.
More precisely the proposition establishes two things. One, the interior fixed price equilibrium
is robust to the availability of second price auctions. Two, the corner equilibrium with auctions is in
general robust to availability of fixed pricing. The first result requires rf (λ) ≤ b and it corresponds
to a parameter space where b is large whereas the second result requires condition (13)9 and so
it covers a region where b is small. We have not made an attempt to characterize equilibria for
intermediate values of b. Finally, constrained efficiency follows from the discussion in Section 3.4.
5 Concluding Remarks
The existing literature on competing mechanisms capitulates that if buyers differ in their valua-
tions then the unique equilibrium entails all sellers holding second price auctions and if buyers are
homogeneous then a large number of mechanisms are payoff equivalent, so sellers are indifferent.
We show that these results are not robust to a fundamental source of heterogeneity: the presence
of budget constrained buyers. If buyers differ only slightly in terms of their ability to pay then we
show that sellers prefer fixed price trading; otherwise they prefer auctions.
Two observations are worth noting, however. First the model is built on the premise that the
economy is large so that the the market utility assumption holds. In a finite economy, a deviation
by an individual seller changes the outside option of of the buyers, so different outcomes may arise.
Second, low budget customers are not allowed to overbid in the auction, which, again, simplifies
the analysis but restricts the outcomes.
9In (13) r̂ > b is needed for the existence of the corner equilibrium and the expression after r̂ in the curly brackets
is simply a sufficient condition that guarantees that a deviation to fixed pricing is indeed unprofitable.
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Appendix I: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. With homogeneous buyers we have b = 1 and l = 0 so that λ= 0 and
λ = λ. The expected utility of a buyer becomes (buyers are identical so one can safely drop the
type specific subscripts in the expression)
U (r, λm|m) =
∞∑
n=0
zn(λm)
1− pm,n+1(r)
n+ 1
= 1
λm
∞∑
n=1
zn(λm) [1− pm,n(r)] . (14)
The second line follows from the fact that zn+1 (λm) = λmzn (λm) /(n+ 1). The expected profit of
a seller is also simplified; we have
Π (r, λm|m) =
∞∑
n=1
zn (λm) pm,n(r) (15)
= 1− z0 (λm)− λmU (r, λm|m) . (16)
We use (14) to obtain the second line. The seller’s problem is
max
λm∈R+
1− z0 (λm)− λmU (r, λm|m) s.t. U (r, λm|m) = U,
where U is the "market utility" for a buyer. The objective function is concave therefore, the first
order condition
z0 (λm) = U
corresponds to a maximum. Conjecture that the FOC holds for all m ∈ M (to be verified). This
implies that
U = z0 (λm) = z0 (λm′) ⇒ λm = λm′ , ∀m,m′ ∈M.
Insert λm = λm′ into (2) to obtain∑
m∈M
γmλm = λ ⇒ λm = λ,∀m,
which means that along the equilibrium path sellers have identical queue lengths. Use λm = λ and
(16) to rewrite the FOC as
Π (r, λ|m) = 1− z0 (λ)− z1 (λ) , ∀m. (17)
SinceM consists of fixed pricing and second price auctions, inserting the specific sale price functions
into (15) to obtain
Π (r, λ|f) = r [1− z0 (λ)] and Π (r, λ|a) = rz0 (λ) + 1− z0 (λ)− z1 (λ) .
Equilibrium list prices are obtained by solving (17) for r; we have
rf = 1− z11− z0 > ra = 0.
Both prices satisfy the FOC with equality; verifying the earlier conjecture. It is immediate that
under either mechanism the expected profit of sellers is pi (λ) = 1−z0 (λ)−z1 (λ) while the expected
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utility to buyers is z0 (λ) . Hence in equilibrium sellers are indifferent between price posting and
auctions. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Lemma 3.3 establishes that if an auction equilibrium exists it must
be such that all sellers cater to both types of customers. So the seller’s problem is
max
r∈[0,b],(λ,λ)∈R2+
1− z0z0 − λUH − λUL
where UH and UL simultaneously satisfy the indifference conditions
UH
(
r, λ, λ
)
= U and UL
(
r, λ, λ
)
= U.
The FOC is given by
dΠ
dr
=
(
z0z0 − U
) dλ
dr
+ (z0z0 − U)
dλ
dr
= 0. (18)
The General Implicit Function Theorem implies that
dλ
dr
= detBdetA and
dλ
dr
= detBdetA,
where
A =
 ∂UH∂λ ∂UH∂λ
∂UL
∂λ
∂UL
∂λ
 , B =
 −∂UH∂r ∂UH∂λ
−∂UL∂r ∂UL∂λ
 , B =
 ∂UH∂λ −∂UH∂r
∂UL
∂λ
−∂UL∂r
 .
Inspecting (8) and (9) one can verify that for j = H,L we have
∂Uj
∂r
= −z0z0,
∂Uj
∂λ
= −Uj , ∂UH
∂λ
= −z0z0 (b− r)
∂UL
∂λ
= −z0z0 (1− r)− z0 (1− b)
1− z0 − z1 − λz1
λ2
.
Observe that (i) 0 < UL < UH and (ii) ∂UL/∂λ < ∂UH/∂λ < 0. It follows that
detA = UL
∂UH
∂λ
− UH ∂UL
∂λ
> 0,
detB = z
2
0z0
λ2
(1− b) (−1 + z0 + z1) < 0,
detB = z
2
0z0
λ
(1− b) (1− λ− z0) < 0.
Substitute UH = U and UL = U into dΠ/dr to obtain
dΠ
dr
= z0detA (c1r − c2) ,
where
c1 = z0
(
detB + detB
)
< 0,
c2 = (1− b)
[
(1− z0) detB +
1− z0 − z1
λ
detB
]
< 0.
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Solving the FOC for r we obtain
dΠ
dr
= 0⇔ r = c2
c1
= λ− z1 − λz1
z0 − z20 + λz1 − z1
(1− b) := r̂.
To verify the SOC note that z0/ detA > 0 since detA > 0. It follows that
sign
(
dΠ
dr
)
= sign (c1r − c2) .
Observe that c1 and c2 are negative constants since detB and detB are both negative and inde-
pendent of r. Therefore dΠ/dr > 0 for all r < r̂ and dΠ/dr < 0 for all r > r̂, which means that
r = r̂ is the global maximum.
Recall that Π is defined under the conjecture r ≤ b, so if r̂ ≤ b then posting r = r̂ maximizes Π.
Below we show that if r̂ > b then all sellers post r = b. First, observe that r̂ > b implies dΠdr
∣∣∣
r=b
> 0,
hence posting any r < b is strictly inferior to posting r = b. Now suppose all stores post r = b and
buyers randomize across stores. In such an outcome agents’ earnings are given by
Π = 1− (1− b) (z0 + z1)− bz0z0,
UH = z0 (1− b) and UL = z0 1− z0
λ
(1− b) .
We will verify that there is no profitable deviation by posting r′ > b. Indeed the deviant store
attracts high types only, so his queue λ′ satisfies
z0
(
λ
′) (1− r′) = UH ,
which implies that
λ
′ − λ = ln (1− r′)− ln (1− b) < 0.
His expected profit equals to
Π′ = z1
(
λ
′)
r′ + 1− z0
(
λ
′)− z1 (λ′) .
Observe that
Π−Π′ = z0
(
λ
′)+ z1 (λ′) (1− r′)− (1− b) (z0 + z1)− bz0z0
= z0
1− b
1− r′ + z0 (1− b)
(
λ
′ − λ− 1
)
− bz0z0.
It is straightforward to show that Π > Π′ if
ln
(
1− r′)+ 11− r′ > 1 + bz01− b + ln (1− b) .
The left hand side increases in r′ so set r′ = b and observe that the inequality holds. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2. To prove the first part of the proposition consider an interior price
posting equilibrium where all sellers post rf (λ) ≤ b. The strategy is to show that this outcome
remains as an equilibrium even if M includes second price auctions.
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Along the said outcome the expected profit of sellers equals to pi (λ) and expected utility of
buyers (for both types) equals to z0 (λ) . Now consider a seller who unilaterally deviates by trading
with auctions and suppose that he posts some reserve price r′. There are two cases to consider:
r′ ≤ b and r′ > b. Start with the first case. Let λ′ and λ′ be the queues at the deviant store
consisting of high and low types. Furthermore let z′n := zn
(
λ
′) and z′n := zn (λ′) . We have
U ′H = z′0z′0
(
1− r′)+ z′0 (1− z′0) (1− b)
U ′L = z′0z′0
(
1− r′)+ z′0 1− z′0 − z′1λ′ (1− b)
Π′ = 1− z′0z′0 − λ′U ′H − λ′U ′L.
These expressions follow from (8), (9) and (10). Note that the deviant seller attracts high types
only even though he posts an affordable reserve price. To see why observe that λ′ and λ′ satisfy
λ′

= 0 if U ′L < z0 (λ)
∈ (0,∞) if U ′L = z0 (λ)
=∞ if U ′L > z0 (λ)
and λ′

= 0 if U ′H < z0 (λ)
∈ (0,∞) if U ′H = z0 (λ)
=∞ if U ′H > z0 (λ)
,
Since U ′H > U ′L we either have z0 (λ) = U ′H > U ′L or U ′H > U ′L = z0 (λ) . The latter case is impossible
since U ′H > z0 (λ) implies that λ
′ =∞, which in turn implies U ′H = 0, which is a contradiction. The
former case is feasible: z0 (λ) = U ′H > U ′L implies that λ′ = 0 and λ
′
> 0 satisfies the indifference
condition z0 (λ) = U ′H . Thus, the deviant seller attracts high types only; low types are strictly better
off with fixed price trading. So we have
U ′H = z′0
(
1− r′) and Π′ = 1− z′0 − λ′U ′H = 1− z′0 − λ′z0 (λ) .
The indifference condition
z0 (λ) = U ′H = z′0
(
1− r′)
implies that λ > λ′. Observe that
pi (λ)−Π′ = z0 (λ) (ex − 1− x) > 0
where x := λ − λ′ > 0. The expression inside the parenthesis is positive for all x > 0, hence the
deviation is not a profitable one.
Now consider the case where r′ > b. The deviant seller, again, attracts high types only; but now
because low types cannot afford to shop at his store. Obviously this is identical to the scenario above;
hence there is no deviation by advertising r′ > b either. So the interior fixed pricing equilibrium
survives auctions.
For the second part of the proposition, suppose condition (13) holds. Since r̂ > b, if an auction
equilibrium exists it must be the corner case where all sellers post r = b (Proposition 3.2). We will
demonstrate that this equilibrium survives the availability of fixed price trading. Expected earnings
along the said equilibrium are given by
UH = z0 (1− b) , UL = z0 (1− b) 1− z0
λ
Π = 1− (1− b) (z0 + z1)− bz0z0.
These expressions are obtained from (8), (9) and (10) by substituting r = b. Below we check if
there is a profitable deviation to fixed pricing. Again, there are two cases to consider: r′ ≤ b and
19
r′ > b. Start with the case r′ ≤ b. Since the deviator trades via fixed pricing he can at most earn b.
So a sufficient condition for no deviation is
Π > b⇔ 1− z0 − z11− z0 − z1 + z0z0
> b.
The inequality is part of condition (13). Now consider the second case with r′ > b. We show that
such deviation is not profitable. Observe that the deviator can attract high types only. Let λ′
denote his queue length and let z′n = zn
(
λ
′)
. His problem is
max
r′>b,λ′∈R+
(
1− z′0
)
r′ subj. to 1− z
′
0
λ
′
(
1− r′) = UH ,
taking UH as given. The problem is standard by now, so the FOC requires z′0 = UH . Substituting
for UH we have
z′0 = z0 (1− b)⇔ λ′ − λ = − ln (1− b) . (19)
The deviant seller’s expected profit equals to
Π′ = pi
(
λ
′) = 1− z′0 − z′1.
Now we can compare Π and Π′. Observe that
Π−Π′ = z′0
(
1 + λ′
)
− (1− b) z0
(
λ+ 1
)
− bz0z0
= z0 (1− b)
(
λ
′ − λ
)
− bz0z0
= −z0 (1− b) ln (1− b)− bz0z0.
The second and third lines make use of (19). It follows that
Π > Π′ ⇔ −1− b
b
ln (1− b) > z0.
Condition (13) has that b < r̂. In the proof of Proposition 4.1 we have established that r̂ <
(1− z0) (1− b) /z0. Merging these inequalities we have
b < r̂ <
1− z0
z0
(1− b)⇒ z0 < 1− b.
It follows that Π > Π′ if
−1− b
b
ln (1− b) > 1− b.
It is straightforward to verify that the inequality above is satisfied for all b ∈ (0, 1) ; hence the
deviation is not profitable. 
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Appendix II: Customers with different valuations
Suppose a fraction η of customers have valuation v < 1 for the good while the rest have valuation 1.
Moreover a fraction l of the high valuation customers have low budgets. We assume that b < v < 1.
The rest of the model remains unchanged.
Our objective is not to characterize all possible outcomes for the entire parameter space. Rather
we focus on the region outlined by condition (24) and characterize the equilibrium where all stores
trade via auctions and buyers randomize over where they visit. This is the outcome McAfee [8] and
others focus on. Then we show that this outcome cannot survive fixed price trading; i.e. a seller
can unilaterally do better than holding an auction if he chooses price posting.
To start, supposeM includes second price auctions only. The dominant bidding strategies are as
follows: high value-high budget types bid 1, high value-low budget types bid b and low value types
bid v. As before we assume that a bid must be accompanied by a deposit of equal value to prevent
overbidding.
Let n and n denote the number of high and low budget types present at a store. Also let n̂
denote the number of low value types. Given the bidding strategies and the fact that b < v < 1,
the sale price is given by
pn (r) =

r if n+ n+ n̂ = 1
b if n+ n̂ ≤ 1 and n+ n+ n̂ ≥ 2
v if n ≤ 1 and n+ n̂ ≥ 2
1 if n ≥ 2
.
If exactly one customer is present then the reserve price is charged. If n+ n̂ ≤ 1 and n+ n+ n̂ ≥ 2
then the sale price equals to b. Observe that low budget types can acquire the item only if n+ n̂ = 0;
indeed they will be outbid when n = 1 or n̂ = 1. If n ≤ 1 and n+ n̂ ≥ 2 then the sale price equals
to v. In this case the presence of low budget types is immaterial; the good is acquired either by a
high-budget type (if n = 1) or a low value type (if n = 0). Finally the sale price is driven up to 1 is
multiple high budget types are present.
We conjecture that in the parameter space outlined by condition (24) the equilibrium reserve
price is affordable, i.e. r < b (to be verified). This means that all sellers cater to all types of
customers. For notational convenience let λ̂ := ηλ, λ := l (1− η)λ and λ = (1− l) (1− η)λ denote
the queue lengths. Also let ẑn := zn
(
λ̂
)
, zn := zn
(
λ
)
and zn := zn (λ). On the equilibrium path
the expected profit of a seller is given by
Π
(
r, λ, λ, λ̂
)
= [z1ẑ0z0 + z0ẑ1z0 + z0ẑ0z1]× r + [z0ẑ0 (1− z0 − z1) + (z1ẑ0 + z0ẑ1) (1− z0)]× b
+ [z0 (1− ẑ0 − ẑ1) + z1 (1− ẑ0)]× v + [1− z0 − z1]× 1.
The expressions in square brackets in front of r, b, v and 1 are the probabilities where these prices
are charged (see above). Given our conjecture that all sellers cater to all types of customers, the
queue lengths λ, λ, and λ̂ are simultaneously determined by
UH
(
r, λ, λ, λ̂
)
:= z0ẑ0z0 (1− r) + z0ẑ0 (1− z0) (1− b) + z0 (1− ẑ0) (1− v) = U (20)
UV
(
r, λ, λ, λ̂
)
:= z0ẑ0z0 (v − r) + z0ẑ0 (1− z0) (v − b) = Û (21)
UL
(
r, λ, λ, λ̂
)
:= z0ẑ0z0 (1− r) + z0ẑ0
1− z0 − z1
λ
(1− b) = U (22)
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These expressions are similar to their counterparts in Section 3.3 and can be interpreted similarly.
Observe that U, Û and U denote the market utilities, which are taken as given. One can show that
Π = 1− z0 (1− ẑ0) (1− v)− z0ẑ0z0 − λU − λ̂Û − λU. (23)
Again 1 can be interpreted as the revenue generated from a sale; z0 (1− ẑ0) (1− v) is the revenue
loss due to encountering a low value type, and z0ẑ0z0 is the loss due to not getting a customer at
all.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose M includes second price auctions only. If
b > max
rF, 1 + U
L
(
rF
)
lnUL
(
rF
)
1− UL (rF)
 and v > vF := 1− z0λ (1− b) + b, (24)
where
rF = λ (1− b) (v − b) (1− z0 − z1)(1− b) (z0 − z20 − z1)+ (v − b)λz1 ,
then all sellers post r = rF < b and buyers randomize across stores.
Proof. The seller’s problem is max
r∈[0,1] and
(
λ,λ,λ̂
)
∈R3+
Π subject to (20), (21) and (22). The FOC
is given by
dΠ
dr
=
[
z0 (1− ẑ0) (1− v) + z0ẑ0z0 − U
] dλ
dr
+[z0ẑ0z0 − U ]
dλ
dr
+
[
z0ẑ0z0 − z0ẑ0 (1− v)− Û
] dλ̂
dr
= 0.
The General Implicit Function Theorem implies that
dλ
dr
= detBdetA,
dλ̂
dr
= det B̂detA,
dλ
dr
= detBdetA,
where
A =

UH
λ
UHλ U
H
λ̂
UL
λ
ULλ U
L
λ̂
UV
λ
UVλ U
V
λ̂
 .
Matrices B, B and B̂ are obtained by replacing, respectively, the first, second and third column of
A with [−U r,−U r,−Ûr]′. Observe that
UH
λ
= −UH ; UHλ = z0ẑ0z0 (r − b) ; UHλ̂ = z0ẑ0z0 (r − b) + z0ẑ0 (b− v)
UL
λ
= UL
λ̂
= −UL; ULλ = z0ẑ0z0 (r − 1)− z0ẑ0
1− z0 − z1 − λz1
λ
(1− b)
UV
λ
= UV
λ̂
= −UV ; UVλ = z0ẑ0z0 (r − b) ; UHr = ULr = UVr = −z0ẑ0z0.
It follows that
detA =
(
UH
λ̂
+ UH
) (
UV ULλ − UVλ UL
)
.
Observe that UH
λ̂
+ UH is positive and that ULλ < UVλ < 0. In addition UL < UV because v > vF
(Condition (24)). It follows that detA < 0. Furthermore
detB = z0ẑ0z0 ×
(
UH
λ̂
+ UH
)
×
(
UVλ − ULλ
)
detB = z0ẑ0z0 ×
(
UV − UL
)
×
(
UH
λ̂
+ UH
)
det B̂ = z0ẑ0z0 ×
(
UH − UV
)
×
(
UHλ − ULλ
)
.
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One can verify that detB, detB and det B̂ are all positive and independent of r. Substitute
UH = U, UL = U and UV = Û into the dΠ/dr and rearrange to obtain
dΠ
dr
= z0ẑ0detA × (c1r − c2) ,
where
c1 = z0
(
detB + detB + det B̂
)
> 0
c2 = (1− b)
[
(1− z0)
(
detB + detB
)
+ 1− z0 − z1
λ
detB
]
> 0.
Solving the FOC for r we obtain
dΠ
dr
= 0⇔ r = c2
c1
= λ (1− b) (v − b) (1− z0 − z1)(1− b) (z0 − z20 − z1)+ (v − b)λz1 := rF
Notice that when buyers are identical in their valuations the reserve price approaches to r̂, that is
limv→1 rF = r̂. To verify the SOC notice that z0ẑ0/ detA < 0; hence
sign
(
dΠ
dr
)
= −sign (c1r − c2) .
Observe that c1 and c2 are both positive constants since detB, detB and det B̂ are all positive and
independent of r. Therefore dΠ/dr > 0 for all r < rF and dΠ/dr < 0 for all r > rF, which means
that r = rF is the global maximum. Finally note that Π is constructed under the conjecture that
r < b; condition (24) requires rF < b verifying the conjecture.
We complete this section by proving that this equilibrium cannot survive if sellers are allowed
to trade via fixed pricing. The proof of the argument is fairly straightforward and follows the steps
of the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 5.2 The auction equilibrium is not sustainable if M includes price posting.
Proof. Along the auction equilibrium we have UL
(
rF
)
< UV
(
rF
)
< UH
(
rF
)
. Indeed UV < UH
is true for all r, whereas UL < UV because v > vF. Furthermore notice that
rF >
1− z0 − z1
z0
(1− b)
implying that UL < z0ẑ0z0.
Now, consider a seller who switches to fixed pricing and posts some r′ < b. Let U ′ denote the
expected utility of buyers at the deviant store. Since the seller competes via fixed pricing U ′ is the
same for all customers present at the store no matter what the type. Since UL < UV < UH it
follows that the deviant store attracts low budget customers only. This is argument is made more
precisely in the proof of Proposition 4.1. Hence, the queue lengths at the deviant store are as
follows: λ′ = λ̂′ = 0 and λ′ satisfies the usual indifference condition. The seller’s problem is
max
r′<b,λ′∈R+
[
1− z0
(
λ′
)]
r′ subj. to 1− z
′
0
λ′
(
1− r′) = UL (rF) .
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The FOC z0
(
λ′
)
= UL implies that he posts r′ = rf
(
λ′
)
and expects to earn
Π′ = pi
(
λ′
)
= 1− z′0 − z′1.
The FOC further implies that λ′ = − lnU
(
rF
)
; hence condition (24) guarantees that
rf
(
λ′
)
= 1 +
UL
(
rF
)
lnUL
(
rF
)
1− UL (rF) < b,
which is what we have conjectured. Now we verify that Π′ exceeds Π, which is given by 23. We
have
Π′ > Π⇔ z0 (1− ẑ0) (1− v) + z0ẑ0z0 + λUL + λUH + λ̂UV − z′0 − z′1 > 0.
Since UL < UV < UH and λ+ λ+ λ̂ = λ it suffices to show
∆ := z0 (1− ẑ0) (1− v) + z0ẑ0z0 + λUL − z′0 − z′1 > 0.
Observe that z0ẑ0z0 = e−λ. In addition the FOC z′0 = UL implies that λ′ > λ because UL < z0ẑ0z0.
Substitute z′0 = UL into ∆ to obtain
∆ = z0 (1− ẑ0) (1− v) + z′0 (ex − 1− x) ,
where x := λ′ − λ > 0. The first expression is positive; the expression ex − 1− x is also positive for
all x > 0. Hence ∆ > 0 i.e. the deviation is profitable.
Observe that a deviation to fixed price trading is possible if buyers are sufficiently similar in
terms of their valuations and budgets. Indeed condition (24) requires b as well as v to be large.
This is is the same intuition that follows from Proposition 4.1.
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